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TORT LAW IN TRANSITION: CHARLES S. DESMOND'S




BY the end of 1965, Charles S. Desmond will have served on New York's Court
of Appeals for twenty-five years, the last six as its Chief Judge. Few ap-
pellate judges enjoy more genuine popularity and more affectionate esteem than
the friendly, even-tempered, unassuming and plain-spoken Chief Judge of the
State of New York. Few have expressed in clearer language and more succinctly
their views on the astonishing variety of legal problems which appellate judges
are expected to resolve with ultimate wisdom. Few have shown greater aware-
ness of the realities, human, ethical, social, governmental, that underlie the
issues presented to them. Few have been less willing to become entangled
in the frayed strands of legal doctrine which seem to thwart the demands
of justice. Few have felt more deeply responsible for adjusting judicial thought
and action to the needs of a society that is caught in the throes of profound
and accelerating change. His jubilee provides a fitting occasion to reflect on
his many contributions to New York's law. From among them, I have selected
a few of those in which he dealt with issues of tort law, mainly those arising
from accidents. I venture to think that, next to the problems of criminal justice,
it is that restless subject that has caused him more than its proportionate share
of judicial anguish. This may be true, in part, because personal injury
litigation has been the cause of one of the glaring blemishes on the contemporary
administration of civil justice, namely, the interminable delays in bringing
accident cases to trial. To his immeasurable credit Judge Desmond has never
relented in his struggle against the notorious public apathy toward this urgent
problem. He has been troubled by the law of torts for a related, and no
less compelling reason. Recently, he addressed himself to current prob-
lems of judicial administration, and more specifically to the jury trial. In
stressing the point that jury trials dispose of no more than a minute fraction
of tort claims and suits, he observed:
The plain truth is that our present substantive and adjective law is
no longer adequate or appropriate for the almost infinite number of
tort suits occurring in our ever more mechanized society. Clearly, an
increased claim-consciousness, plus the trend toward compulsory
insurance, and the specialization by a sizable segment of the bar in tort
claims, have combined to produce a kind and amount of litigation with
which old fashioned substantive concepts and court procedures simply
cannot cope. And, yet, as William Dean Howells is reported to have
once said: "Whatever is established is sacred, to those who do not
think."
* Professor of Law, School of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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There is an air of unreality about the insistance on jury trials in
personal injury suits and, indeed, about the whole business of personal
injury lawsuits.'
There can be little doubt that the malaise over the law of torts which
colors these observations is shared by thoughtful members of the profession
everywhere. Whether their diagnosis conforms to the Chief Judge's is another
question. Indeed, in singling out the public's increased claim-consciousness,
the trend toward compulsory insurance and the specialization of the bar he
may have meant no more than to illustrate the complex etiology of a disturbing
phenomenon. In any event, it should give us pause that, after a quarter-
century's judicial toil in weighing and deciding thousands of appeals and writ-
ing over one hundred opinions in tort cases, an appellate judge of our most
industrialized state could come to such somber conclusions.
Few will question the fact that the near-universal practice of liability in-
surance has turned modem tort litigation into a pursuit sui generis. Judge
Desmond has noted the emergence of a specialized bar. Of equal interest
are what may be termed the logistic aspects of modern tort litigation. A small
number of insurance companies simultaneously participate in thousands of law-
suits, each conducted in the name of a particular defendant, the insured. Insur-
ance carrier policies and attitudes, responsive to managerial, competitive, financial
and strategic needs, are brought to bear on thousands of cases at the same
moment. Company policies ultimately determine whether whole groups of
cases are settled or carried into active litigation. In contrast, the insurer's
control over a private "docket" of tens of thousands of cases also permits it
to single out specific cases, not necessarily financially "worthwhile," for testing
in the highest courts if a particular legal issue seems strategically significant.
The lessons thus learned may be reflected in future company policy and indeed,
may be applied by the entire insurance industry. Thus, this type of litiga-
tion assumes significance far beyond the adjudication of a legal dispute
between private individuals. Where, as in New York since 1956, automobile
liability insurance has become compulsory, most New York residents, in a
significant sense, are privies to any litigation in which the terms of their
compulsory policy are at issue.
As we examine some of the Chief Judge's more prominent opinions in
this area, they will yield further clues to the forces that have put legal doctrine
and practice, uneasy companions at best, so far asunder that tort litigation,
in his words, has "lost contact with reality." And further, we may find that
the Judge found it possible-in a field traditionally more hospitable to judicial
innovation than any other-to close or at least narrow the distressing gap
between the "is" and the "ought" of the law of torts. What follows are brief
comments on some of the Judge's opinions whether written for a majority
of his court or in dissent.




One of the common law's arresting anomalies is its failure to develop a
general principle of liability for intentional wrongdoing. In contrast, after
considerable toil, it proved itself equal to the task with respect to negligent
conduct although there the difficulties in applying a broad principle to an
infinite range of human activities, seem more formidable. As a result, within the
deceptively simple confines of the ancient trespass tort, courts have continued
to struggle to this day with a variety of disparate fact situations and policy
issues. And, not surprisingly, the decisions although reaching sound results
could not always be fitted neatly into those rigid molds. Worse, in heeding
the ancient doctrines, many judges failed to find the proper answers. The
resulting confusion has inspired eloquent complaints.
2
In Phillips v. Sun Oil Co.3 Chief Judge Desmond dispelled some of the
fog that still hangs over trespass to land in New York. The facts were simple
enough. Gasoline leaked from defendant's tank and somehow seeped under-
ground into plaintiff's well, seventy-five feet away. Unable to show that
defendant knew or should have known about the seepage, plaintiff abandoned
counts based on nuisance and negligence whereupon the trial court dismissed
a third count based on trespass to land, a decision that was affirmed both by
the appellate division and the Court of Appeals.
Referring to a medley of old cases that dealt with straying cattle, a bal-
loonist's emergency descent, soil subsidence caused by construction work, a
flood caused by excavation, Judge Desmond redefined trespass to land:
Trespass is an intentional harm at least to this extent; while the tres-
passer, to be liable, need not intend or expect the damaging conse-
sequences of his intrusion, he must intend the act which amounts to
or produces the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must be at least
the immediate or inevitable consequence of what he willfully does, or
which he does so negligently as to amount to willfulness .... 4
If this definition does not still all doubts, it took a step forward toward
doctrinal clarity; its emphasis on intentional or at least "willful" conduct
makes it plain that a truly accidental intrusion is henceforth not to be con-
sidered a trespass.5
The mischief caused to our law by the "petrified forest"0 of the trespas
2. For an example that singles out New York as target, see Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1951).
3. 307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
4. Id. at 331, 121 N.E.2d at 250. (Emphasis added.)
5. In amplifying his definition, the judge further quoted from the first Restatement
that the trespassory act must be such as "will to a substantial certainty result in the entry
of the foreign matter." Restatement, Torts (1934), § 158, comment h. The Restatement
Second corrected the ambiguity in the quoted phrase by stating what was evident from the
outset: "It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty
result in the entry of the foreign matter." (Emphasis added.) Restatement Second, Torts
§ 158, comment 1 (1965).
6. The phrase is Chief judge Traynor's who applied it to the traditional body of choice
of law rules; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 670 (1959).
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torts and the random nature of the judicial process are neatly illustrated by the
aftermath of Judge Desmond's opinion. Heretofore it had been assumed, in the
light of both state and federal decisions that in New York operators of airplanes
were strictly liable for ground damage caused by aircrashes.
7
After Phillips, a federal district judge held that Judge Desmond's
opinion did not change the existing law on ground damage by falling airplanes.
8
Yet, in a major disaster caused by the crash of two jetliners into New York
City's streets, state trial courts, relying on Judge Desmond's opinion summarily
rejected strict liability for personal injuries and damage to personal property
whether based on a trespass theory or on the ultrahazardous character of air-
plane operations.9 The second department affirmed' 0 and plaintiff was unable to
secure review by the Court of Appeals.:"
Where do we stand? Conceding that the dusty trespass concepts no
longer dictate the terms for dealing with aircrashes, are we to assume
that, in disposing of an insignificant lawsuit over a small leak in a gasoline
tank Judge Desmond meant to dispose of truly major issues in the law of
torts? Here the question was whether operators of jet planes with their much
higher potential for widespread disaster are strictly liable for injury or prop-
erty damages to persons on the ground. The second department seemed to have
no difficulties in reaching the view that Judge Desmond's opinion precluded
strict liability, for it decided without writing an opinion.' 2 And Judge Des-
mond's Court agreed, also without stopping to give us its views. There is cer-
tainly an irrational element in the way in which insignificant cases and issues
claim the judges' full attention while others, incomparably more important, are
hurriedly disposed of per curiam or denied review.
NEGLIGENCE
To place the Chief Judge's contribution in the area of accident law into
historic perspective we may note that when he became a judge negligence was
still central to all thinking about torts. For this predominance there is abun-
dant evidence. To illustrate, Professor Leon Green had published only a few
years earlier a panoramic survey of the law of torts13 followed shortly there-
after by a similar effort of Professor Francis H. Bohlen,' 4 the Reporter of the
7. Hahn v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Guile v.
Swan, 19 Johns Ch. R 381 (N.Y. 1822); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc.
849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co., 1933).
8. Margosian v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 464, 466-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
9. Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
In accord, save for "abnormally dangerous aircraft" or abnormally dangerous flying, but
on the basis of statistics and cases antedating the jet age of the sixties, the proposed Restate-
ment Second, Torts, Tent. Draft No. 10, § 520A.
10. Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1962).
11. Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 11 N.Y.2d 1053, 184 N.E.2d 180, 230 N.Y.S.2d
207, motion for rearg. denied, 11 N.Y.2d 1114, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1962).
12. Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 A.D.2d 659, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1962).
13. Green, One Hundred Years of Tort Law, in 3 Law, A Century of Progress, 1835-
1935, 34-79 (1937).
14. Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 724 (1937).
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first Restatement of Torts. Although the surveys of these distinguished scholars
differed from each other, both devoted the bulk of their attention to the law
of negligence; neither felt any need to talk about strict liability., A bit earlier,
Professor Seavey had published his classic appraisal of Justice Cardozo's con-
tributions to the law of torts. In his view16 the most notable of Cardozo's
opinions were devoted to the clarification of the negligence concept. Although
the decision that is likely to remain his greatest achievement, namely, McPher-
son v. Buick,'1 was in fact a decision for a consumer-plaintiff against an indus-
trial defendant, Professor Seavey noted that "in a majority of the tort cases
in which [Cardozo] .. .rendered opinions, the court denied the plaintiff re-
covery and, in most of the cases, deprived him of the judgment which had been
awarded to him in a lower court.' 8 As we are all aware, the intervening years-
the years of Chief Judge Desmond's tenure-have brought startling changes in
the picture of the law of torts as reflected in those writings: Most of the changes
have tended to make it easier for all courts, including the Court of Appeals, to
grant rather than to deny recovery to plaintiffs.
If the concept of negligence has not further been refined it has
certainly been substantially expanded for the benefit of plaintiffs in a steadily
widening variety of fact situations. Paralleling this expansion there has been
a steady and continuing erosion at the very core of the concept. It became, for
one reason or another, ever easier for plaintiffs to establish negligence. Most of
the erosion was the result of the greater concern of our society with the welfare
of its members; the rising tide of liability insurance made it possible to dis-
tribute and thus minimize the cost of a widening responsibility. The net effect
has been in many instances what Professor Ehrenzweig has identified in an
apt if ironic epigram as "negligence without fault."
Even as thus modified, the negligence concept appears to be yielding its
central place in the tort universe as we are entering an era in which the notion
of strict liability will serve as a complement if not counterpoise to the fault
principle. As we shall see, so far as the law of New York is concerned, the
vigorous Chief Judge often had a hand, or at least his say, in these broad devel-
opments most of which I suggest he approved in principle if not always in the
particular context that was before him.
Limitations on Duty
Judge Desmond's approval of the broad trend toward greater protection
for accident victims is by no means unqualified or uncritical. There are at least
two important areas in which he refused to join a majority of his court in
liberalizing existing law. In a third, involving parental immunity, he spoke for
15. See the fleeting reference to Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), in Green,
supra note 13, at 41, 42.
16. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 20 (1939).
17. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
18. Seavey, supra note 16, at 21.
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a strong majority in upholding the established rule. In two other situations,
however, he firmly rejected the traditional immunity rules, once speaking for
the majority and once in dissent.
1. Emotional Harm
In a 1961 case 9 the infant plaintiff alleged that defendant's employee had
negligently failed to lock her securely into a ski-lift and that, as a result, on her
descent she suffered "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with resid-
ual physical manifestation." The majority held that a cause of action had been
stated. To reach this result it overruled a sixty-five year-old precedent that had
required a physical "impact" on plaintiff as a condition of recovery for mental
harm and its results.20 The majority pointed to the many inconsistencies of
the old "impact" rule, to the strong trend in other jurisdictions against it, to
the numerous law review articles urging its elimination. The opinion might
have stressed, although it did not, that the new rule was formulated in an in-
stance where plaintiff was negligently exposed to pkysical harm. None of these
considerations kept Chief Judge Desmond from disagreeing. He joined in dissent
with Judge Van Voorhis who bluntly voiced his fears of seeing a broader rule of
liability pressed in practice to its extreme conclusion. In Van Voorhis's view such
a rule would add a "fertile field" to the constantly enlarging recoveries, with "an
influential portion of the bar organized as never before to promote" that objec-
tive, with medical experts "for a consideration" expressing opinions that cause
and effect existed, and with courts and juries uncritically accepting their opinion
as fact.2 1
2. Mental Strain Causing Heart Attacks
The Chief Judge voiced another, not unrelated dissent from an important
innovation in the field of workmen's compensation: In a leading case2 the
majority held that an employee's fatal heart seizure brought on by anxiety and
mental stress arising out of his employment is an industrial accident within the
reach of New York's workmen's compensation statute. In that case, the em-
ployee, a 33-year-old engineering executive, was blamed by the airline's presi-
dent when a federal agency grounded one of the company's two planes because
it had been poorly maintained. The employee lived through a short period of
extreme stress and anxiety during which he desperately struggled to minimize
the delay and expense of the needed airplane repairs. Although he had shown
no previous cardiac symptoms, his grim experience culminated in a fatal heart
attack. Judge Desmond firmly rejected the majority's 'holding "as an unprece-
19. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 NXE.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
20. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
21. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 243, 244, 176 N.E.2d 729, 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
39 (1961).
22. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d
14 (1961).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
dented decision."'23 In his view, granting awards for heart attacks caused by
purely mental stress, in the absence of some definite physical exertion, would
make, as Judge Finch had warned almost thirty years earlier, "workmen's com-
pensation the equivalent of life and health insurance" 124 He could see no
statutory basis for classifying the employee's heart attack an "industrial acci-
dent" which alone would justify an award. Changes, he felt, if thought desirable
must come from the legislature.
The dramatic circumstances of this case make Judge Desmond's distinc-
tion between physical and mental strain seem arbitrary. Thus, on the facts,
the majority holding seems preferable. Yet, the larger issue remains. Can the
majority's rule, depending as it does, on a careful weighing of facts, be meaning-
fully applied in the administration of "mass justice" by workmen's compen-
sation boards? In the light of the avalanche of administrative and judicial
awards in heart seizure cases which followed this case, one cannot help feeling
that Judge Finch's early warning, echoed by Chief Judge Desmond, accurately
predicted the course of events.
3. Parental Immunity
Finally, we should note a third instance where the Chief Judge, this time as
the spokesman for most of his brethren, refused to abandon an immunity rule
that has come under increasing attack. In Badigian v. Badigian25 an infant, three
years old, was injured when his father left his car unlocked, and the infant,
after releasing the brakes, tried to jump from the vehicle. Judge Desmond,
in a very brief opinion, affirmed the dismissal of the child's cause of action
against the father. He viewed the parental immunity
as a direct application of a concept that cannot be rejected without
changing the whole fabric of our society, a fundamental idea that is at
the bottom of all community life. The basic principle is that children
and parents form a unique kind of social unit different from all other
groups.2 6
While he conceded the existence of certain exceptions from the immunity
rule, he saw them as falling outside the normal parental relationship, e.g., where
the injury is intentional or committed in the course of the parent's business.
There may be need for special provision if disability continues beyond infancy
but to meet that need is the legislature's business. Judge Jacobs of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey dissenting from a similar ruling handed down in the same
year, noted that the immunity "has been universally condemned in the
thoughtful professorial and student writings on the subject. '27 Judge Desmond
shows little patience with these academic exercises: "the writers who attack the
23. Id. at 216, 176 N.E.2d 719, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
24. Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 317, 12 N.E.2d 311, 319 (1938).
25. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961).
26. Id. at 474, 174 N.E.2d at 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37.
27. Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 254, 163 A.2d 147, 151 (1961).
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no-liability rule misunderstafd its basis and purpose."28 It is improper, in his
view, to point to compulsory insurance as justifying the demise of the immunity
rule: current insurance rates do not contemplate indemnity since they are based
on recent loss experience which does not include the type of suit here con-
templated. Interestingly enough, he does not advance a modern, pragmatic
argument in favor of continuing the immunity, namely, the danger of too much
rather than too little family harmony, or less frivolously, the danger of fraud
by the family unit.
Should we agree with two commentators who concluded, "The Court
of Appeals missed a golden opportunity to overhaul an antiquated judicial
doctrine."? 29 It would seem that the elaborately documented dissent by
Judge Fuld refutes many of the arguments in favor of the immunity. It is
evident that Judge Desmond's grand generalization about the family unit proves
too much; immunity ends when a child comes of age; it never applies where
property relations are at stake. And is not the crushing burden of a severe
accident apt to break a family? If this unique kind of social unit must remain
so totally immune so as to avoid changing the fabric of our society, it should
not be amenable even to legislative innovations. Furthermore, how do we explain
the rejection of the immunity in common law jurisdictions outside the United
States? 30 The immunity rule in fact is judge-made and of fairly recent vintage,
having been proclaimed for the first time in 1891 in Mississippi in a suit for a
child's malicious confinement. 81 The lack of common law precedents may be
explained by the fact that, absent insurance or other unusual circumstances, the
economic incentive for suing was lacking. Finally, the argument that current in-
surance rates are not geared to the new liability carries weight only if it could
be shown-and this is unlikely-that such claims would appear in very sub-
stantial numbers. Otherwise they are not likely to affect the rate-making process;
contrary to what lawyers and law professors have assumed, rate-making is not
a very precise process.32 In any event, the insurance industry eventually would
adjust itself to new rules of substantive law, as it has done on numerous other
occasions. Yet, nagging doubts remain. Should we permit the negligent father
to benefit, along with the child victim, from the funds supplied by insurance?
Is not this benefit different in kind from the relief which liability insurance is
designed to provide for the insured tortfeasor? Would we, in effect, convert a
liability policy, in this instance, into a sort of family accident policy? What-
ever the answers, the absence of American precedents shows that other juris-
dictions continue to agree with the result if not the reasoning of the Chief
judge's opinion.
28. 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 174 N.E.2d 718, 719, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (1961).
29. Goebel & Rashap, Family Law, 1961 Survey of N.Y. Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1549,
1559 (1961).
30. See, e.g., Fleming, Law of Torts 644-45 (3d ed. 1965), and cases cited in n.2.
31. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
32. Cf. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 550 (1961).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW.
4. Prenatal Injuries
The overruling of precedents calls into play an appellate judge's highest
skills. To be truly successful, the act must elude many hazards. The judge must
not cross over the uncertain line that divides judicial from legislative com-
petence. To avoid being left stranded, he may not venture too far in advance
of what he perceives to be the community's sense of justice, in itself an elusive
datum. In trying to articulate its true meaning he must not be distracted by
the clamor of partisan interests. Finally, he must search out both the right
moment and the compelling case for the venture so as to cushion the shock
of discontinuity.
Measured by these criteria, among Judge Desmond's opinions that broke
with precedents, Woods v. Lancet33 offers a classic model for the casebooks.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant permanently maimed him by an injury negli-
gently inflicted when he was still in his mother's womb, during her ninth month
of pregnancy. Thirty years earlier, in a case involving similar facts, the Court of
Appeals had held such a claim inadmissible.3 4 Judge Desmond, speaking for a
majority of the Court (Judges Lewis and Conway dissenting) overruled the
earlier decision, and held that plaintiff's claim could be maintained. The Judge's
opening words appeal with the sober eloquence that is often present in his
opinions, to our sense of justice: "It will hardly be disputed that justice (not
emotionalism or sentimentality) dictates the enforcement of such a cause of
action." 35
In conforming the "law" with "justice" the opinion first proceeds to show
that the old rule had lost whatever vitality it once may have claimed. It "must
be examined against a background of history and of the legal thought of its
time and of the thirty years ... since it was handed down."M3 The Court had
formulated it in 1921 because it could find no precedent justifying recovery by
an infant for a pre-natal injury. Moreover, it thought proof of the damage was
too elusive to be evaluated and finally, on a more theoretical plane, it agreed
with a view expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes another thirty-seven years earlier
that a child en ventre sa mare has no separate existence from her and hence
she alone could recover whatever damages may be allowable.
37
None of these reasons have remained strong enough to withstand the light
of present-day thought. The evidentiary difficulties of proving an injury under
these circumstances are not special to a child's suit; the trial courts and many
administrative tribunals face similar problems daily in thousands of cases. In
any event, "it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty of proof can ever
destroy a legal right."38
33. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
34. Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
35. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 351, 102 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1951).
36. Id. at 352, 102 N.E.2d at 692.
37. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
38. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951),
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The Judge has little use for the purported theorem that a nine-month
foetus in utero, later born alive, is not "a being in esse." "To hold, as matter
of law, that no viable foetus has any separate existence which the law will
recognize is for the law to deny a simple and easily demonstrable fact. This
child, when injured, was, in fact, alive and capable of being delivered and of
remaining alive, separate from its mother."39
The final and, in the Judge's view, "basic" '40 reason for the old rule was
the lack of precedent for it, both within the state and elsewhere. Since 1921 a
number of appellate courts in the United States and in Canada have permitted
infants in plaintiff's situation to sue the tortfeasor. Moreover, "of law review
articles on the precise question there is an ample supply. '41 They all condemn
the old rule. Thus, the only argument in the way of reversal today is stare
decisis. Here Judge Desmond vigorously expresses his philosophy of the judicial
function in deciding torts cases:
[Lack of precedent] ... is not a very strong reason... in a case like
this. Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their business deal-
ings should not be changed in the middle of the game, but what has
that to do with bringing to justice a tort-feasor who surely has no
moral or other right to rely on a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals? Negligence law is common law, and the common law has
been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in many another
case.... We act in the finest common-law tradition when we adapt
and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice. . . . The
same answer goes to the argument that the change we here propose
should come from the Legislature, not the courts. Legislative action
there could, of course, be, but we abdicate our own function, in a field
peculiarly non-statutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and un-
satisfactory court-made rule.
42
While the appellate courts of only five states had upheld the infant's right to
sue before Judge Desmond wrote this opinion, the year 1951 marked the be-
ginning of what Dean Prosser has described as "the most spectacular abrupt
reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts." 48 It is
characteristic of the rapid movement of the law of torts that since 1951 the
battle has moved into new ground. Sooner or later the Court will face such
issues as whether a child may sue for an injury suffered before it became viable,
i.e., capable of separate existence, and whether it should continue to deny a
wrongful death action on behalf of the next of kin of a child stillborn as a re-
sult of a prenatal injury.44
39. Id. at 357, 102 N.E.2d at 695.
40. Id. at 353, 102 N.E.2d at 694.
41. Id. at 349, 102 N.E.2d at 693.
42. Id. at 355-56, 102 N.E.2d at 694.
43. Prosser, Law of Torts 356 (3d ed. 1964).
44. See, Matter of Logan, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Surr. Ct. 1956) (no
recovery in event of miscarriage, aff'd, 2 A.D.2d 842, 156 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dep't 1956),
aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 800, 144 N.E.2d 644, 166 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Kelly v. Gregory, 282




In light of the painful inadequacies of the public services provided by our
cities and their steadily mounting problems, the Judge's attitude toward mu-
nicipal tort liability is particularly significant. Cardozo's famous decision in
Mock v. Rensselaer Water Co. had held in 1928 that a citizen could not recover
for the negligent failure of a waterworks company to supply, after notice of a
fire, the water pressure which it had contracted to provide.45 The main reason
given by Judge Cardozo is not persuasive, namely that the passive withholding
of a benefit (i.e., the water needed to quench the fire) was not an actionable
tort. Had not defendant negligently lulled plaintiff and the city into inaction,
i.e., into a failure to secure other protection against fires? The decision (widely
followed elsewhere) has, however, been defended on policy grounds. It freed
waterworks and municipalities from potentially crushing burdens; since prop-
erty owners are usually insured against fire losses, a contrary rule would sim-
ply enable the insurance companies to reimburse themselves by way of subro-
gation.
Shortly after this decision, the New York legislature abolished the sovereign
immunity of the state46 and in 1945, a unanimous Court of Appeals swept aside
all remaining governmental tort immunities by declaring that "the legal irre-
sponsibility ... enjoyed by . .. [counties, cities, towns and villages] . . . was
nothing more than an extension of the exemption from liability which the State
possessed. '47 It reached this momentous decision in a case in which a run-
away police department horse had severely injured the plaintiff.
A few months later, the Court of Appeals again faced an issue not unlike
Mock. 48 The plaintiff's house was destroyed when, upon the outbreak of a fire,
it proved impossible to combat it because the city had negligently failed to
maintain the valves and hydrants regulating the water pressure. Relying on
Mock, the majority affirmed the dismissal. Judge Desmond dissented on the
ground, inter alia, that the Bernardine doctrine broadly abolishing governmental
tort immunities applied not merely to the conduct of a police department but
a fire department as well. An actionable wrong is stated at least where "the
city failed to keep its fire equipment in good order, with resulting damage to
the property of the citizen. . .. "49
Quite recently, the City of Amsterdam was sued for its negligence in fail-
ing to take action against violations of the Multiple Residence Law. According
to the pleadings, after a fire occurred in an apartment building, a captain of
the city fire department directed the tenant to discontinue using a leaking oil
heater until it was repaired. The captain did not report to the Commissioner
for recovery), appeal granted, 283 App. Div. 914, 129 N.Y.S.2d 914 (3d Dep't 1954) for the
best general discussion, see Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 579 (1965).
45. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
46. N.Y. Ct. C. Act § 8.
47. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945).
48. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
49. Id. at 59, 64 N.E.2d at 708.
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of Public Safety nor did he warn the landlord. No action whatever was taken
by the city. The use of the leaky oil heater continued and caused a second fire
which killed and injured several people. The majority affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint. 50 It held that there was no general liability to the public for
civil damage in event of failure to supply adequate policy or fire protection.
If liability is imposed in certain cases, it is done because failure to comply
with the particular statute involved results in damage to one of a class for
whose special benefit the statute was enacted. Judge Desmond was the lone
dissenter. After enumerating the frequent instances in which tort liability was
imposed for various municipal failures to comply with statutory commands,
he concluded:
The time has come to remove from our law all the remaining vestiges
of governmental immunity. We should be done with exceptions and
incongruities. We should cut through the wilderness of special instances
and say, as we did of hospital immunity in Bing v. Thunig . . ., that
municipal nonliability for injury-causing breaches of duty is archaic
and unjust. Cities should be held to the same standards of conduct as
apply to private persons, since risk of liability (and insurance against
the risk) is incidental to municipal activities. 51
Damages-The KILBERG Landmark
It would be inappropriate on this occasion not to mention here Judge
Desmond's famous contribution to the conflict law of torts, namely Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines5 2 Plaintiff's intestate, a New Yorker and a passenger on
defendant's plane bound from New York to Massachusetts, died when the
plane crashed near Nantucket. Plaintiff sued to recover damages of 150,000
dollars (including loss of prospective earnings) based on defendant's breach
of contract for decedent's safe carriage. The trial court refused to dismiss
this cause of action but the appellate division reversed, considering it, despite
its contract label, as sounding in tort and hence subject to the 15,000 dollar
damage limit of the applicable Massachusetts wrongful death statute. It took
Chief Judge Desmond only a few lines to conclude that the appellate divi-
sion rightly dismissed the cause of action based on contract. In this conclu-
sion, his entire court concurred. Yet, he and three of his brethren would not
halt here. He noted that, in the trial court, plaintiff had yet another cause of
action pending. Sounding in tort, it sought only the maximum allowed under
the applicable Massachusetts wrongful death statute, namely 15,000 dollars.
Addressing himself to this cause, Judge Desmond concluded that it would not
be subject to the 15,000 dollar limit-a limit that plaintiff, of course, had
sought to escape by framing his other cause of action in contract. What led
the Judge to this unorthodox conclusion? Considering the speed and the hazards
go. Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d.
595 (1965).
51. Id. at 141, 204 N.E.2d at 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600. (Emphasis added.)
52. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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of air travel, he pointed out "the place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous.
Our courts should if possible provide protection for our own State's people
against unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from
these disasters." 53 This protection, he found, could be granted "conformably to
our State's public policy and without doing violence to the accepted pattern
of conflict of law rules." 54 Pointing to a provision of the New York constitution
specifically banning any limitation on damages, he noted that the policy against
limiting recoveries in wrongful death actions was 11... strong, clear and old."1
5
Hence, the Court must refuse to enforce that part of the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute precisely as it had done when comparable attempts were made to
limit recovery by contractual stipulations. Moreover, since the Court had never
decided the issue whether the measure of damages in wrongful death actions is
procedural or substantive it should opt for the procedural characterization
"particularly in view of our own strong public policy as to death action
damages .... ,"56 This would result in applying New York's law to the measure
of damages. Hence, the Court concluded plaintiff "may apply if he be so advised
for leave to amend his . . . [tort] cause of action accordingly."
5 7
Judge Fuld flatly refused to deal with the tort claim since he thought the
court not entitled "to discuss or decide an issue which not only is not
argued by the parties, but actually is not raised or presented by the record."
5 8
Yet he indicated that so far as the contract claim was concerned, stare decisis
alone, rather than reason, prevented the Court from applying the New York
wrongful death statute (which knows no damage ceiling) to this claim. For
clearly, compared with the "adventitious . ..crash" in Massachusetts, New
York, where the parties contracted for safe carriage, had the "more significant
contact" with the case. Judge Froessel, another dissenter, believed, too, that
the majority went beyond its province in considering the tort claim. But in
contrast to Judge Fuld, he met head-on the merits of the majority's holding on
that claim; he declared it to be contrary to established principles of the law
of conflicts both in New York and elsewhere, and thought that it raised, in
fact, grave doubts about its constitutionality.
This cannot be the occasion for examining the conflicts aspects of this
bold opinion. Suffice it to say that academic and judicial opinion has widely
endorsed Judge Desmond's refusal in this instance, to shackle, in a New York
forum, a New York citizen's claim by the obsolete and inequitable restrictions
of a foreign statute so clearly repugnant to New York's policy and interest.
His opinion has greatly stimulated and will continue to stimulate legal thought
and writing; it has paved the way, in New York and other states, for further
53. Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
54. Id. at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
55. Id. at 39, 172 NYE.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
56. Id. at 41, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
57. Id. at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
58. Id. at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 530, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
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advances of the law of conflicts, as illustrated by the equally well-known
Babcock v. Jackson"9 decision and its numerous progeny.
Yet, some marginal comments on this landmark decision seem appropriate;
for it discloses some of the Judge's conceptions of the judicial function. The
holding was criticized for its unusual notice, just mentioned, to the parties
that the Court would disregard the Massachusetts ceiling on damages if the
wrongful death claim were brought before it. This notice was given although
the claim was not pending on appeal and although it had not been briefed and
argued. The late Professor Currie stoutly and, in my view, rightly, defended
Judge Desmond's action. He stressed that the real concern of both parties was
with the Massachusetts ceiling on damages, not with the abstract division of
tort and contract. Once the Court had concluded that the contract theory was
inadmissible but, nevertheless, the ceiling on damages should be disregarded,
an abstemious, discreet judicial silence might, in Mr. Currie's view, simply
have precipitated another round of appeals, or worse, a settlement in ignorance
of the Court's considered view of the law.
To this may be added that, in the common carrier situation, the contract-
tort dichotomy has a singularly arbitrary character; for instance, early decisions
clearly indicated that, had the victim survived, unlimited damages ex contractu
would have been recoverable. Moreover, the appellate division itself was un-
impressed by the distinction. It noted that the contract cause of action was
"patently [seeking] .. . to avoid the recovery limitations of the Massachusetts
death statute." 60 Conceding that it was "seductively clothed in form ex con-
tractu,"6' the court refused to consider it as anything but a tort action. If so,
why make a fetish out of an appellate rule when the risks of doing injustice
or causing further litigation are so igh? Finally, the Court may not have been
unaware that the crash had claimed other victims whose representatives were
seeking compensation. Should they, too, have been kept in the dark on the
Court's real thinking? If judge Desmond's holding was "dictum," it certainly
was comparable to those he and Judge Fuld repeatedly uttered in the war-
ranty cases.02a These carefully considered statements of the law are sui generis,
a modern form of prospective overruling of precedents of which we will doubt-
less see more in the future. They should be welcomed rather than criticized.
The dissenters also objected to the majority's readiness to decide without
the benefit of briefing and argument; the short answer is that this practice
while not common is surely not beyond the province of an appellate court.
Not only the Court of Appeals but the Supreme Court of the United States
has followed it from time to time even in cases as fateful as Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins G2 and Mapp v. Ohio.6 3
59. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
60. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 10 A.D.2d 261, 262, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1st
Dep't 1960).
61. Id. at 262, 198 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
62a. See pp. 292, 294, 295 infra.
63. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Almost as fascinating as the decision itself was its immediate aftermath.
First of all, paradoxically, the plaintiff did not seize the unusual opportunity
offered by the majority opinion. Since the decedent was single, plaintiff was
unable to establish dependence of the next of kin on the decedent significant
enough to warrant a claim beyond the 15,000 dollars. Hence he accepted a
settlement even below this amount. 64 Secondly, the administratrix of another
New Yorker who had died in the same disaster had filed a diversity suit against
the airline based on the Massachusetts wrongful death statute. The district
court for the southern district of New York felt bound to follow the Kilberg
holding and, accordingly, entered judgment for the plaintiff for some 135,000
dollars.65 The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the Kilberg ruling
was unconstitutional, a ruling which it labeled, in its five-page opinion, no less
than seven times as a "dictum": to apply the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute stripped of its ceiling on damages violated the full faith and credit
clause. Judge Kaufman, in a detailed and vigorous dissent, defended the con-
stitutionality of the Kilberg holding. Shortly thereafter, the Second Circuit
reconsidered the appeal en banc and by a 6:3 decision repudiated the
panel's holding that Kilberg was unconstitutional.0 6 Judge Desmond had been
vindicated.
STRICT LIABILITY
The law often advances with scant regard for doctrinal niceties. A judicial
or legislative innovation may outdistance, as it were, its own doctrine. Judges
and writers then struggle to come to terms with the newcomer and to assign
it a fitting place in the conceptual edifice. The effort may continue for decades
and longer. The modern branches of strict liability illustrate the point: vicarious
liability, liability for ultrahazardous activities, workmen's compensation, all
have given rise to intense theoretical controversies which continued long after
the new dispensations had become firmly entrenched in legal practice.
We may be witnessing a similar phenomenon in the instance of products
liability. It is here that during Judge Desmond's tenure the most significant
changes have taken place. For better or for worse, the view has gained wide
acceptance that losses due to a personal injury inflicted by a defective product
should not be borne by the ultimate consumer even if he cannot establish the
maker's fault. What led to this shift of public opinion? Was it prompted by
the notion that, typically, the modern industrial giants with revenues larger
than those of most modern states, are better able to absorb the loss? Is it
thought, less primitively, that most manufacturers are able to treat the loss as
a cost of doing business and spread it by insurance or by other means? Is
64. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1962) Currie,
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke LJ. 1, reprinted in Currie,
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke U. Press, 1963) ch. 14, p. 690.
65. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 199 F. Supp. 539, motion for judgment n.o.v. denied,
201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
66. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
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this view an unexpected by-product of the psychological pressures exerted by
modern merchandising practices? Is it a compound of these and other rea-
soned or instinctive reactions to the recent advent of the new industrial and
welfare society? Whatever the answer, legal doctrine and practice are faced
with the painful chore of making room for a new principle. The chore is es-
pecially critical for two reasons. First, the principle is as yet inchoate. The doc-
trinal'explanations may influence its reach. Secondly, the principle itself, like
all notions of strict responsibility, challenge the raison d'etre of traditional tort
law. If society's concern is no longer with defendant's fault but with compen-
sation for the injured plaintiff, compensation that is to be recouped through
"loss distribution," what criteria set it apart from social security which, simi-
larly, distributes a growing number of life's hazards among the many?
In 1961 the Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge Desmond,
joined the vanguard of American judges who saw the problem as a challenge
to judicial rather than legislative action. In doing so, the Court returned to a
pioneering role which it had first assumed in 1916. In MacPherson v. Buick67
Judge Cardozo had placed the relation of private consumer to the manu-
facturer of a defective product squarely into the context of negligence. To
accomplish this, he swept aside the privity rule which until then had prevented
a direct action by the consumer against a negligent manufacturer. The new
doctrine dispensed with privity in damage suits by ultimate purchasers against
the makers of defective products which were likely to endanger them. Almost
fifty years later, the Court was evidently primed to re-examine .the same central
issue in light of the widely felt need to expand consumer protection beyond the
confines of negligence. Yet, this time the random character of the judicial process
denied the judges the chance of a similar, classic confrontation." Instead, on
three successive occasions the Court had to deal with somewhat different, if
related aspects of consumer protection in our industrialized society. As a result,
its efforts to formulate new doctrine became more difficult and controversial.
Greenberg v. Lorenz
The first occasion for the new departure was simple enough. A 15-year-old
girl sued a grocer who had sold a can of salmon to her father. A sliver of metal
embedded in the salmon had injured her mouth. The Court speaking through
Judge Desmond held her claim based on breach of implied warranties of fitness
and wholesomeness stated a cause of action although her father, not she, had
purchased the can. 69
With characteristic directness, Judge Desmond pointed to the numerous
precedents which had denied similar warranty claims on the ground that privity
67. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
68. Such confrontations occurred in a number of cases elsewhere, above all in
Henningsen V. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,'32 NJ. 358, 161*A.2d 69 (1960) and in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). They
held the manufacturer strictly liable.
69. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
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between plaintiff and defendant was lacking. He saw the Court's difficulty "not
in finding the applicable rule but in deciding whether or not to change it." He
pointed to a "lengthy bibliography" of writings urging this departure from the
strict privity rule,70 to legislative apathy in the face of repeated requests to
relax that rule by statute and finally to the restiveness among the lower courts
over its continued survival. 71 Concluding that it is neither just nor sensible to
confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer, he observed that
henceforth "[A] t least as to food and household goods, the presumption should
be that the purchase was made for all the members of the household."7 2
Thus stated, the new presumption was a relatively limited if welcome step
forward, taken after quite a few other jurisdictions and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code73 had shown the way. Indeed, Judge Froessel in a concurring opinion
meant to go thus far but no further; he would have left it to the legislature to
adopt whatever further action were needed. The Chief Judge, however, as well
as the remaining judges, was evidently persuaded that the time for action had
arrived, and he was ready to serve notice of impending changes. Judge Desmond
observed that the development of privity and warranty law were traditionally
within the domain of judicial responsibility since the former was judge-made
and the latter, at least historically, was thought of as sounding in tort. Re-
ferring to MacPherson v. Buick, he forcefully stated: "Alteration of the law
in such matters has been the business of the New York courts for many years."
Implying that the present facts were not the only illustration of the harshness
attending the privity rule he continued: "So convincing a showing of injustice
and impracticality calls upon us to move but we should be cautious and take
one step at a time .... -74
There is irony in the fact that these momentous dicta were first uttered
in a case against a retail grocer. Judge Froessel, although, as noted, concurring
in result, was moved by the defendant's plight. And why not? In any rational
scheme of consumer protection, the case against the retailer is weakest. Unless
we think of the great chain stores, a retail grocer usually merely distributes
another's wares, may not always be alert to the need for full insurance protec-
tion and even if able to pass on the loss to his supplier is often poorly equipped
to withstand the initial shock of liability. Moreover, the growth of long-arm
jurisdiction has lowered the jurisdictional walls that, in the past, sheltered
the producer from a consumer's claims.
On the other hand, it is also true that Judge Froessel's plea was rejected
thirty years earlier by another Chief Judge of the Court. Cardozo then held a
70. Id. at 199, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
71. Judge Starke, of the Municipal Court of New York had pleaded for a change in
an opinion of 32 pages; Parish v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d
7 (1958).
72. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39,
42 (1961).
73. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318.
74. Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39, 42 (1961).
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grocer similarly liable when a wife, deemed to be her husband's agent, had
bought a loaf of packaged bread from a grocer. The husband sued him when a
pin concealed in the bread hurt his mouth. The Court of Appeals upheld the
judgment against the defendant. 75 Cardozo first read into the sale the grocer's
warranty of "merchantability. '76 He then held that the usual rule of damages
for its breach, i.e., merely the difference in price between a defective and a
"merchantable" item did not apply because here personal injuries were fore-
seeable if the warranty were breached. Hence, the damages were measured by
the full amount of injuries suffered. Cardozo displayed little sympathy for the
innocent grocer's plight: "The burden may be heavy. It is one of the hazards
of business .... [T] he law casts the burden on the seller, who may vouch in
the manufacturer if the latter was to blame. The loss in its final incidence will
be borne where it is placed by the initial wrong. ' 77 Why the initial wrong?
Even in 1931 the manufacturer was liable to his privies for his product's
"merchantability" although innocent of any wrong.78 Here we have the nucleus
of strict liability as we see it unfolding today. To be sure, it still lies concealed
under the misleading terminology and the limitations of warranty and was used
in a "food" case. But Cardozo's reinterpretation of "merchantability" and of
the rule of damages attending the breach of this warranty transformed their
function. What was originally tailored to meet the needs of merchants dealing
among each other, has now become an instrument of consumer protection. Per-
ceptively, a contemporary student commentator diagnosed Cardozo's opinion
as symptomatic of the spread of strict liability. Not unlike Judge Froessel he
called for legislation, a call that at least during his generation, went largely
unheeded. 79
Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.
The second of the trilogy of cases was brought not by a private consumer
but a garment maker. Defendant promoted one of its products, an industrial
resin as a chemical agent that would "shrink-proof" fabrics.80 Defendant saw
to it that its labels were attached to fabrics and garments treated with its
product. Plaintiff, relying on defendant's widely advertised representations
about its product's efficacy, bought from two mills fabrics treated with the resin
and thus supposedly immune to shrinking. When garments cut from the "shrink-
proofed" cloth-shrunk when washed, the garment maker suffered heavy com-
mercial losses.
75. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
76. N.Y. Sess. L. 1911 ch. 571, as amended N.Y. Sess. L. 1941 ch. 47, § 7 (now
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-314).
77. 255 N.Y. 388, 395, 175 N.E. 105, 107 (1931).
78. It was not until 1938 that the Court held a breach of an implied warranty a
wrongful act and a tort for purposes of a wrongful death action, Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co.,
277 N.Y. 26, 34, 12 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1938).
79. Note, 16 Cornell L.Q. 610, 614 (1931).
80. Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
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Judge Fuld, speaking for a majority of the Court (the other judges con-
curred in the result) refused to let the resin producer invoke the rule of privity
against the garment maker's claim that he had breached an express warranty.
In a world of advertising through mass media, distinctive labeling, and other
devices, the policy of protecting the public against misrepresentation of the
advertised and labeled wares, assumed, in the Court's view, paramount im-
portance. The judge-made rule of privity must yield so that protection may
be afforded to those at whom the advertising is aimed even if they had not
dealt with the manufacturer. This overriding policy of protecting the public
led the Court further to reject explicitly defendant's contentions that it did
not supply a defective chattel but merely a chemical ingredient used in treat-
ing another's product. Nor did it matter that the plaintiff was an industrial
rather than a private consumer or that it suffered commercial loss rather than
personal injury or property damages."'
The holding is noteworthy in several respects. First, in the struggle with
the privity and warranty concepts the Court emancipates itself, if somewhat
obliquely, from the context of the law of contracts, evidently anticipating a
return to the historic tort environment of warranty.82 Secondly, the opinion
repudiates privity in a new context, i.e., of an industrial consumer which suffers
commercial loss because it relies on a manufacturer's promotional claims. One
may wonder whether typically an industrial firm is as naive as a private con-
sumer about an industrial product, as incapable of testing it, as much in need
to be protected against parties other than its "privies, '8 3 or as weak in absorb-
ing or distributing on a loss. Thirdly, the Court places heavy emphasis on
modern marketing and advertising practices in a purely commercial context.
Does the opinion mark the emergence of a new principle of strict liability for
innocent misrepresentations made in the course of present-day marketing cam-
paigns?
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.
A little over a year later, Judge Desmond completed the first cycle of New
York's modern warranty cases by his majority opinion in Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.8 4 Again, the opportunity to state a new principle against the
backdrop of a simple and compelling fact situation eluded the Court. Plaintiff's
daughter, a fare-paying passenger, had died in the crash of an American Air-
81. A different rule for commercial losses may apply to warranties that are merely
implied, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
82. Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 10-11 n.2, 181
N.E.2d 399 n.2, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 n.2 (1962), stresses the purely historical accident
that tied the warranty concept to contract rather than tort law which gave birth to it.
Later the opinion flatly refuses to exempt defendant from "strict liability" because fabric
shrinkage rather than a personal injury was involved; Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 403-04, 226
N.Y.S.2d at 370.
83. Perhaps in this case the plaintiff was akin to a private consumer in one respect-its
suppliers had apparently been able to disclaim all warranties, see Randy Knitwear Inc. v.
Fairtex, 7 N.Y.2d 791, 163 N.E.2d 349, 194 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1959).
84. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
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line's plane in New York. Could the plaintiff, as her daughter's administratrix,
maintain a wrongful death action for breach of implied warranty of fitness
against Lockheed, the plane's manufacturer and against Kollsman, the pro-
ducer of the allegedly defective altimeter that caused the crash? In Judge
Desmond's words, the Court had "granted leave to appeal [from the dismissals
below] to take another step toward a complete solution of the problem
partially cleared up [by the two preceding decisions]." 5 These had made
it clear that a breach of warranty is "a tortious wrong suable by a non-
contracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer." 86 For Judge Desmond MacPher-
son v. Buick was an extension of "court-made" negligence liability to a non-
contracting consumer. Similarly, the Court's two preceding privity decisions
already had extended manufacturer's liability for his defective product. He
now was liable to a noncontracting consumer for breach of implied warranty if
the article is a source of danger to one whose use is contemplated. "[I] t is no
extension at all to include airplanes and the passengers for whose use they are
built .... ,"8 Judge Desmond approved the break with the past, emphasizing
as "surely . ..more accurate" Chief Judge Traynor's reference to the new
duties owing to consumers as based on "strict tort liability." Yet for the
present at least, the Chief Judge refused to extend it to Kollsman, the manu-
facturer of the defective component, since he thought the protection afforded
to users by holding the airplane manufacturer liable was adequate.
Clearly, Judge Desmond's ruling with respect to the airplane manufacturer
is consistent with the language and mood if not the facts of the previous deci-
sions. That the injured consumer contracted for a "service" instead of buying
the manufacturer's product appears -hardly significant once it had become clear
that the Court had left behind the narrow terms of the Uniform Sales Act.
Furthermore, it would have been a surprising retreat if the Court had decided
to immunize manufacturers which supply service equipment to carriers because
the latter are only liable for breach of due care regarding both equipment and
service. To carve out at this juncture an immunity for certain manufacturers
from a broad principle that has barely been introduced would have been both
difficult and productive of unforeseeable complications.
The only really startling aspect of the opinion is its bold and frankly
pragmatic approach to the issue of the instrument maker's liability. Although
it allegedly made the defective product, the opinion was willing to accord it
immunity from strict liability; yet, it is made very clear that the rule of immu-
nity is tentative only. Presumably, the fear of crushing small enterprises with
potentially huge damage claims contributed to this "abstention" as much as the
justification offered explicitly. Yet, what will keep the plane-maker from suing
89. Id. at 433, 191 N.E.2d at 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
86. Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
87. Id. at 437, 191 NXE.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
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Kollsman for breach of warranty unless some novel variant of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale is invoked to spare the defendant? Or is the problem to be resolved on an
ad hoc basis, so that the maker of a component part will be held whenever
"justice and equity" require it? We will have to wait for the answers.
The pioneering, "activist," character of Judge Desmond's opinion stands
out in the light of Judge Burke's dissent which, in substance, is a plea for
judicial abstention. It, in part, conceded that the Court had moved "beyond the
purpose and policy of the Sales Act" toward a strict products or enterprise
liability.s8 Yet, it scored the holding as unsupported by the new rationale.
According to Judge Burke, that rationale seeks not to influence conduct-that
is the job of liability based on fault-but to place the loss on the enterprise
strategically best situated to distribute it. In his view that enterprise is the
airline, not the plane's manufacturer, and in making the plane manufacturer
strictly liable, the holding creates an anomaly: the "dominant" enterprise, i.e.,
the carrier, is liable to its passenger for due care only, while the supplier of the
aircraft is strictly liable. For Judge Burke, to change the basis of liability of
airlines to their passengers, is not a judicial but a legislative function; legis-
latures alone have access to the information needed to reach a proper decision.
Evidently, the division among the judges is symptomatic of clashing phi-
losophies about the judicial function. It is, of course, true that the law of torts
has traditionally been developed by judge-made rather than statutory law. Yet,
the dissent appears to ask: How valid is this tradition in an industrial society
in which the complexity, subtlety and variety of economic interrelations is
staggering and in which any change of a tort rule may have far-ranging and
unforeseen consequences? The majority evidently does not believe in judicial
abstention in the face of this problem. It is plainly convinced that the time
has arrived to place the risk of industrial mishaps on industry rather than on
the consumer. Judges must not postpone the fulfillment of this demand of
social justice to the ideal morning after a listless legislature has investigated
and decided. As in the past, judicial innovation must run the risk of producing
anomalies and even errors. Anomalies and errors may, in turn, call for further
innovation or stimulate legislative action that otherwise might never have
been forthcoming. It was surely appropriate for our Chief Judge to be the
majority's spokesman on this occasion.
88. Id. at 439, 191 N.E.2d at 85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 597.
